WHEN TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT INTERSECT: NEW DEFECTS IN THE DEATH PENALTY by Bunin, Alexander
Western New England Law Review
Volume 26 26 (2004)
Issue 2 Article 2
12-16-2009
WHEN TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT
INTERSECT: NEW DEFECTS IN THE
DEATH PENALTY
Alexander Bunin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alexander Bunin, WHEN TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT INTERSECT: NEW DEFECTS IN THE DEATH PENALTY, 26 W. New
Eng. L. Rev. 233 (2004), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss2/2
WHEN TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT 







Most death penalty schemes in the United States today deter­
mine whether a defendant is guilty of capital murder during a sen­
tencing hearing. In every other criminal case, a trial determines 
guilt, and a sentencing hearing selects a punishment for a guilty 
defendant. 
The effect of this is that some elements of capital murder are 
denied the procedural protections of a trial. Providing a less relia­
ble procedure for determining elements of a capital crime is without 
any precedent in American law or its common law foundations. 
This disparity has been revealed by recent Supreme Court cases dis­
tinguishing between the elements of a crime and sentencing factors. 
A. Trial vs. Sentence 
A sentencing hearing is fundamentally different from a trial. It 
permits evidence that is not admissible to prove guilt.1 There is no 
presumption of innocence.2 It may be decided by a preponderance 
of the evidence.3 A judge may select the sentence.4 
A trial is restricted by formal rules of evidence and procedure.5 
* Alexander Bunin is the Federal Public Defender for the Districts of Northern 
New York and Vermont. He is an adjunct professor at Albany Law School, of Union 
University. 
1. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,246 (1949) (distinguishing procedures 
at trial and sentencing). 
2. Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1993) (no presumption of innocence 
exists at a sentencing hearing). 
3. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002) (burden of "beyond a reason­
able doubt" not required). 
4. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462-64 (1984) (Sixth Amendment does not 
require that a jury select punishment). 
5. Williams, 337 U.S. at 246 ("Tribunals passing on the gUilt of a defendant always 
have been hedged in by strict evidentiary procedural limitations."). 
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A defendant is presumed innocent.6 The prosecution must prove 
all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.7 A jury is 
required.8 
Elements of a criminal offense are any facts the prosecution 
must prove to make a defendant eligible for the highest punishment 
set by the legislature.9 It does not matter how the legislature 
chooses to characterize those facts.1° If a fact increases the maxi­
mum punishment for a crime, it is an element of that crime.11 Each 
element must then be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 
before a defendant is guilty of the crimeP 
It is only the conviction of a crime, which fixes the sentencing 
range required by statute.13 The statutory range is located between 
the minimum and maximum sentences for the crime of conviction.14 
Once those parameters are set by the finding of guilt, the selection 
of punishment is a choice of sentences within that range.15 The de­
termination of a sentence within the appropriate range can then be 
made, without jury participation, and by a mere preponderance of 
evidence.16 
For example, Title 18 of the United States Code contains most 
of the criminal offenses enacted by the Congress. Each statute is 
defined by certain facts. These facts are elements of a crime that 
must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a defen­
dant may be found guilty. If Congress adds a new fact that in­
creases the maximum punishment, then Congress has created a 
new, greater crime. That additional fact must be proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a defendant to be guilty of 
the greater offense. 
6. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (presumption of innocence is a 
basic tenet of American trials). 
7. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (burden of "beyond a rea­
sonable doubt" is required at trial). 
8. [d. 
9. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000) (proof of a fact that in­
creases the statutory maximum punishment is an element of the crime). 
10. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 549-50 (2002). 
11. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2536 (2004). 
12. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 (portions of a single statute containing escalating statu­
tory maximum punishments are separate crimes). 
13. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986) (conviction of a crime 
sets the statutory range). 
14. Harris, 536 U.S. at 549 (the statutory range is between the minimum and max­
imum punishments set by the legislature). 
15. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2002) ("a specific sentence 
within the range authorized by the jury's finding ... "). 
16. Id. 
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B. Capital Cases 
In a capital case, facts that make a defendant eligible for the 
death penalty are elements of the crimeP These capital elements 
are called "statutory aggravating circumstances."18 Absent a find­
ing of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance by a jury, be­
yond a reasonable doubt, the crime of capital murder is not proven 
and the death penalty may not be considered.19 
In most death penalty cases, the existence of statutory aggra­
vating circumstances is not decided during the guilt phase of trial, 
but rather during the sentencing hearing.20 A capital jury receives 
proof of the elements and information for selecting punishment, to­
gether at a unitary proceeding.21 Therefore, in most death penalty 
jurisdictions, a capital defendant is prosecuted for some elements of 
capital murder without the trial protections available even to a per­
son charged with a simple misdemeanor. 
This manner of bifurcating a capital trial was implemented by 
legislatures to answer Eighth Amendment concerns about restrict­
ing the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, and assuring 
that those persons could present mitigating evidence.22 These laws 
17. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (A fact that is necessary to make a 
defendant eligible for the death penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.). 
18. [d. (sometimes also called aggravating factors). 
19. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003) ("[F]or purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee the underlying offense of 'murder' is a distinct, 
lesser included offense of 'murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances ...."'). 
20. See 18 U.S.c. § 3593 (1997); 21 U.S.c. § 848 (e) (1996); ALA. CODE § 13A-5­
45 (e), (f) (1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (G) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 
(1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (2003); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 53a-54b (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 
921.141 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (2001); 720 
ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/9-1 (d) (2004); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9a (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-4624 (b) (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (2001); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 905.3 (1988); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303 (b) (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99­
19-101 (1973-2000); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 
line (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. 175.554 (2002); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (IV) (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (c) (2002); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 31-20A-1 (2002); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (Consol. 2003); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-2000 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 163.150 (2001); PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (B) (1985); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (2002); TEX. 
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (2003); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (2001). Compare OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (2002) with WASH REv. CODE § 10.95.060 (1981). 
21. Jones V. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1999) (describing federal capital 
sentencing procedures). 
22. See Eddings V. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,110 (1982) (capital sentencer must be 
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were designed before recent Supreme Court cases applying the def­
inition of offense elements to mandatory sentencing factors.23 
The issue is not whether bifurcation of a capital trial and the 
sentencing hearing is proper. It is. The question is at what point 
must the trial end and the sentencing hearing begin? The answer is 
that the selection of punishment may be decided once the elements 
of the crime have been proven. Yet in most capital cases, the sen­
tencing hearing begins before all the elements of capital murder are 
decided. 
In jurisdictions where statutory aggravating circumstances are 
not decided until the sentencing hearing, the following anomaly oc­
curs. At the guilt phase, a jury may only convict a defendant of a 
crime that is less than capital murder.24 After conviction of this 
lesser crime, the jury then enters a sentencing phase.25 Only then 
are the capital elements decided.26 
The sentencing hearing is not subject to the rules of evidence27 
or the presumption of innocence.28 The jury receives the evidence 
of guilt along with other information supporting a death sentence.29 
This other information usually includes the effect on the victim's 
family and community,3° predictions of the defendant's future dan­
gerousness,31 the defendant's prior uncharged conduct,32 examples 
of the defendant's bad character,33 and hearsay,34 none of which is 
generally admissible at the guilt phase of the trial.35 
allowed to consider any relevant mitigating evidence); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
189 (1976) (capital statute must channel the sentencer's discretion). 
23. See supra note 20. 
24. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 110-11. 
25. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 3593 (d) ("[r]eturn of special findings"). 
26. See, e.g., 18 U.s.c. § 3593 (c) ("[p]roof of mitigating and aggravating 
factors"). 
27. Id.; compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (1993) with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 905.3 (1988) (applying rules of evidence). 
28. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 3591 (a) ("[a] defendant who has been found guilty 
...."). 
29. United States v. Jones, 527 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1999) (describing federal capital 
procedures). 
30. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (victim impact statements are 
admissible at a capital sentencing hearing). 
31. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161 (1994) (predictions of a capital 
defendant's propensity for future violence are admissible at sentencing). 
32. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (prior criminal behavior is 
admissible at sentencing hearing). 
33. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (character evidence is an 
appropriate sentencing consideration). 
34. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244-47 (1949). 
35. In a trial before verdict the issue is whether a defendant is guilty of hav­
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The jury then deliberates upon two very different issues, 
whether the defendant is guilty of capital murder and whether a 
death sentence is appropriate.36 Although eligibility for the death 
penalty must be decided beyond a reasonable doubt, the selection 
of punishment may be decided by a preponderance of evidenceY 
Selection may be determined by a judge.38 
By deciding the capital elements at the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant does not receive protections provided during the proof 
of guilt for any other crime.39 To the extent that capital elements 
are proved, it is a sentencing hearing in name only. Calling it a 
sentencing hearing does not resolve the discord caused by deciding 
the capital elements without traditional trial protections. Three re­
lated areas of law have converged to cause this conflict: the right to 
a jury in criminal trials, traditional sentencing law, and modern cap­
ital sentencing law. Although these areas overlap, their develop­
ment has generally received separate treatment. 
I. THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL 
Sir William Blackstone warned in the 1760s that jury trials 
could be undermined by "new and arbitrary methods of trial" and 
that the inconvenience of jury trials was "the price all free nations 
must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters. "40 Two hun­
dred years later, the United States Supreme Court struck down a 
Maine statute for reducing the prosecution's burden of proof in a 
ing engaged in certain criminal conduct of which he has been specifically ac­
cused. Rules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials which 
narrowly confine the trial contest to evidence that is strictly relevant to the 
particular offense charged. These rules rest in part on a necessity to prevent a 
time-consuming and confusing trial of collateral issues. They were also de­
signed to prevent tribunals concerned solely with the issue of guilt of a particu­
lar offense from being influenced to convict for that offense by evidence that 
the defendant had habitually engaged in other misconduct. A sentencing 
judge, however, is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within 
fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of 
punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. 
Id. at 246-47. 
36. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1999). 
37. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002). 
38. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 417, 462-63 (1984). 
39. See Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1993) (no presumption of inno­
cence at sentencing hearing); Williams, 337 U.S. at 246-47 (no rules of evidence at sen­
tencing hearing). 
40. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 342-44 
(n.p. 1769). 
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murder case.41 By presuming a defendant acted with premedita­
tion, the statute eliminated the necessity for a jury finding of the 
mens rea for murder, and infringed upon a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to jury tria1.42 
Two decades later, the Supreme Court addressed the effect of 
proving facts that raise the statutory maximum for an offense. In 
Jones v. United States ,43 the Court stated that "under the Due Pro­
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial 
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior con­
viction)44 that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be 
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. "45 
The following year, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court dis­
tinguished between offense elements and sentencing factors.46 Of­
fense elements are those facts necessary to subject a defendant to 
the statutory punishment range.47 Sentencing factors direct a sen­
tencer to choose punishments within the statutory range.48 
Whether a finding is an offense element or sentencing factor de­
pends upon the effect of the inquiry, not how the legislature chose 
to characterize the finding.49 For example, a finding that the crime 
was based upon the victim's race, subjecting the defendant to a 
higher maximum punishment, is an offense element.5o On the other 
hand, a finding that a defendant brandished a firearm, to establish a 
mandatory minimum punishment, is a sentencing factor. 51 
41. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975) ("[T]he distinction established 
by Maine between murder and manslaughter may be of greater importance than the 
difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes."). 
42. [d. at 703-04. 
43. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999) (holding that proof of 
serious bodily injury or death for higher maximum punishments were additional offense 
elements of carjacking). 
44. An exception for prior convictions was stated in Almendarez-Torres v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1998) by a 5-4 majority. However, one member of that 
majority has since announced his vote was in error, raising the possibility that this ex­
ception may someday be extinguished. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 520-21 
(2000) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
45. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6. 
46. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494. 
47. Id. at 483. 
48. [d. at 494 n.19 ("The term appropriately describes a circumstance, which may 
be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a specific sentence within 
the range authorized by the jury's finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular 
offense.") 
49. [d. at 494 ("[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect ...."). 
50. [d. at 482-83. 
51. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002). 
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Although this article is concerned with the effect on capital 
cases, particularly in the federal courts, the Supreme Court's ruling 
in Apprendi changed the way many crimes are prosecuted. For in­
stance, under federal law, possession with intent to distribute 100 
grams of heroin has a maximum punishment of forty years impris­
onment.52 Absent proof of at least that quantity of heroin, the 
maximum punishment may not exceed twenty years.53 
Before Apprendi, such drug quantities could be found by a 
judge relying on a report from a probation officer.54 Now the issue 
must be alleged by indictment and decided by a jury during the guilt 
phase of tria1.55 After Blakely v. Washington, even minor sentenc­
ing enhancements may require such treatment.56 By placing the de­
termination of drug quantities during the guilt phase, it is now 
subject to both the rules of evidence57 and the presumption of inno­
cence.58 A sentencing hearing lacks these protections.59 
The Supreme Court was then confronted with its previous deci­
sions regarding a defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. Ten 
years before Apprendi, the Court held in Walton v. Arizona that the 
aggravating circumstances introduced at a capital sentencing hear­
ing were sentencing factors, not offense elements.6o Dissenting in 
Apprendi, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the effect of an aggra­
vating circumstance was to make a defendant eligible for the death 
penalty. Thus, under the Court's new analysis, an aggravating cir­
52. 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(1)(B) (federal criminal penalties for controlled 
substances). 
53. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 628 (2002) (drug quantity is an 
element of 21 U.S.c. § 841). 
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) (Presentence Report). 
55. United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 660 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
We conclude, following Apprendi's teachings, that if the type and quantity of 
drugs involved in a charged crime may be used to impose a sentence above the 
statutory maximum for an indeterminate quantity of drugs, then the type and 
quantity of drugs is an element of the offense that must be charged in the 
indictment and submitted to the jury. 
Id. 
56. See United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 73 
U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004). 
57. FED. R. EVID. 1l01(b) ("These rules apply generally ... to criminal cases and 
proceedings. "). 
58. Delo V. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278 (1993) (presumption of innocence exists 
during gUilt phase of trial). 
59. FED. R. EVID. 1l01(d)(3) ("The rules (other than with respect to privileges) 
do not apply in the following situations: ... Proceedings for ... sentencing ...."). 
60. Walton V. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (citing Poland V. Arizona, 476 
U.S. 147, 156 (1986)). 
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cumstance would have to be treated as an offense element.61 Wal­
ton, which allowed a judge to make the findings regarding 
aggravating circumstances, appeared to be in opposition to Ap­
prendi's requirement of a jury verdict. 
Two years after Apprendi, the Court overruled Walton in Ring 
v. Arizona,62 raising the question of what other ramifications exist 
for a capital sentencing hearing that combines proof of elements 
and the determination of a sentence. An examination of traditional 
sentencing and modern capital sentencing explains why offense ele­
ments must belong as part of the guilt phase of a trial and not the 
sentencing hearing. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SENTENCING 
At common law, a judge was required to impose sentences spe­
cifically sanctioned by criminal statutes.63 In other words, punish­
ments were mandatory, of which most were death sentences.64 If a 
judge thought a sentence was inappropriate, the judge had to in­
voke the pardon process to commute the punishment.65 Since there 
was no range of sentences to choose from, limiting judicial discre­
tion was unnecessary. A judge simply had little discretion to 
constrain.66 
61. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 537-38 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissent­
ing) ("The distinction of Walton offered by the Court today is baffling, to say the 
least. "). 
62. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
63. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479 (citing LANGBEIN, THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL 
JURY ON THE EVE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, IN THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, 
FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, 36-37 (A. Schioppa, ed. 1987». 
64. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 9 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3rd ed. 1982); 
see also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-98 (1971) (most common-law 
murders required a mandatory death penalty); Justice Antonin Scalia, Sherman J. Bell­
wood Lecture, University of Idaho (Sept. 7, 2000), in Alice Koskela, Scalia Shows Tex­
tualists Have a Sense of Humor, 43-0CT ADVOC. 31 (2000) ("There was a trial, and 
they were either released or hung."). 
65. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692-94 (1975). 
66. [d. An example of the extreme lengths necessary to avoid injustice was the 
"benefit of clergy." 
[T]he widespread use of capital punishment was ameliorated further by exten­
sion of the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligi­
ble for "benefit of clergy," a procedural device that effected a transfer from 
the secular to the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. And under ecclesiastic law a person 
who committed an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he received a 
one-year sentence, had his thumb branded and was required to forfeit has 
goods. At the turn of the 16th century, English rulers, concerned with the 
accretion of ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular, enacted a 
series of statutes eliminating the benefit of clergy in all cases of "murder of 
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That system carried over to the Colonies.67 Punishments were 
mostly fines, whippings, stocks, banishment, and the gallows.68 
Originally, the jury did not impose the sentence.69 Jurors merely 
found whether the defendant was guilty of the statute.70 
It was only by the 1820s that prisons became a standard form 
of punishment in the United States.71 With the creation of prisons, 
judges were given discretion regarding how long a prisoner could be 
confined.72 State legislatures and Congress began creating criminal 
laws with ranges of punishment.73 Legislatures set the minimum 
and maximum punishments allowed.74 Judicial discretion increased 
with devices like probation and indeterminate sentences.75 
Absent mandatory sentencing considerations, a judge has dis­
cretion to sentence a defendant anywhere within the statutory 
range.76 This can lead to drastically divergent sentencing policies 
among judges even in a single jurisdiction.77 In recent decades, leg-
malice prepensed." Unlawful homicides that were committed without such 
malice were designated "manslaughter,"and their perpetrators remained eligi­
ble for the benefit of clergy. 12 Hen. 7, c. 7 (1496); 4 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1512); 23 
Hen. 8, c. 1, ss 3, 4 (1531); 1 Edw. 6, c. 12, S 10 (1547). 
Id. 
67. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 ("[T]he historical foundation for our recognition of 
these principles extends down centuries into the common law."). 
68. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 112 (Norval 
Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
69. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 ("trial by jury, and judgment by court"). 
70. The practice of jury sentencing arose in this country during the colonial 
period for cases not involving capital punishment. It has been suggested that 
this was a 'reaction to harsh penalties imposed by judges appointed and con­
trolled by the Crown' and a result of 'the early distrust of governmental 
power.' 
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 200 n.lO (1971) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMIS­
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: 
THE COURTS 26 (1967». 
71. ROTHMAN, supra note 68, at 111 ("[A]n idea developed: those convicted of 
crimes would be confined behind walls, in single cells, and would follow rigid and un­
yielding routines."). 
72. Id. at 126 ("[T]he prison sentence was to substitute confinement for 
executIOn. . ..").. 
73. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 ("Since the 19th-century shift in this country from 
statutes providing fixed-term sentences to those providing judges discretion within a 
permissible range ...."). 
74. Id. ("That discretion was bound by the range of sentencing options prescribed 
by the legislature."). 
75. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1949) (holding that non-judicial 
devices such as a probation report may be used by a court in a sentencing decision). 
76. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 Uudge has wide discretion within minimum and 
maximum punishments). 
77. See A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING 
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islatures became concerned with further limiting judicial discre­
tion.78 Reacting to sentencing diversity, legislatures imposed 
greater limitations on judicial discretion in an effort to make sen­
tencing more uniform.79 
The new limitations on discretion were in the form of specific 
factual considerations affecting the length of sentence.80 Whether 
contained within the charged criminal statute, or referenced in a 
separate sentencing law, these considerations came to be known as 
sentencing factors. 81 The most dramatic examples of sentencing 
factors are mandatory minimum punishments82 and sentencing 
guidelines.83 
The appearance of escalating minimum sentences, based upon 
a finding of additional facts, has only recently become wide­
spread.84 Quantities of drugs,85 the presence of firearms,86 and 
"hate crimes"87 all have been predicates for higher mandatory mini­
mum sentences. 
Sentencing guidelines are based upon numerical scales that de­
fine the seriousness of the offense and the severity of a defendant's 
criminal history.88 By adding and subtracting points assigned to va­
rious factors, a judge is given a far more limited choice of sentences 
than the statutory minimum and maximum.89 A judge may ignore 
these restrictions only for strictly defined reasons.90 
The Supreme Court approved both mandatory-minimum 
STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (Federal Judicial Center, 
No. 74-4 1974). 
78. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989) (sentencing guidelines 
mandated by Congress do not violate the separation of powers between the branches of 
government). 
79. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002) ("In the latter part of the 
20th century, many legislatures, dissatisfied with sentencing disparities among like of­
fenders, implemented measures regulating judicial discretion."). 
80. See, e.g., 21 U.S.c. § 841 (2004) (providing mandatory minimum sentences 
based upon drug quantities). 
81. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19. 
82. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,93 (1986) (approving mandatory mini­
mum punishment for possession of a firearm). 
83. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367 (discussing federal sentencing guidelines). 
84. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999) (discussing whether a 
fact is an element of an offense or a sentencing factor). 
85. United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 2001). 
86. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93. 
87. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491-93 (2000). 
88. See, e.g., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2003) [hereinafter 
U.S.S.G.]. 
89. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5A ("Determining the Sentence"). 
90. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (known as "departures"). 
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sentences91 and sentencing guidelines.92 When sentencing factors 
are used to restrict judicial discretion below the statutory maximum 
punishment they do not offend the Constitution.93 However, when 
those systems require judges to find facts that increase the maxi­
mum sentence, they violate the Sixth Amendment.94 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the different pro­
cedures at trial and sentencing are based upon their different 
goals.95 Therefore, prior to the advent of sentencing factors there 
was little reason for any factual findings at a sentencing hearing.96 
Due process did not require trial protections and no jury participa­
tion was necessary. 97 
III. THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY 
In 1972, the Supreme Court struck down all existing death pen­
alty statutes in the United States.98 Those statutes were found to 
violate the Eighth Amendment by giving juries unfettered discre­
tion to impose the death penalty.99 Legislatures enacted new death 
penalty schemes that attempted to restrict the class of persons eligi­
ble for the death penalty and to limit jury discretion.1°o 
To comply with the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty 
must be proportionate to the offense charged. WI Individual culpa­
91. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,567-68 (2002) (explaining judicial find­
ing of fact establishing mandatory minimum sentence did not violate defendant's right 
to jury trial). 
92. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (approving formation of 
the United States Sentencing Commission to set sentencing guidelines). 
93. Harris, 536 U.S. at 558 ("Judicial factfinding in the course of selecting a sen­
tence within the authorized range does not implicate the indictment, jury-trial, and rea­
sonable-doubt components of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments."). 
94. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004). 
95. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (contrasting trial and sentenc­
ing procedures). 
96. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20-22 (2003) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence). 
97. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (citing Hildwin v. Florida, 490 
U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989», overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
98. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
99. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ("Because of the uniqueness of the 
death penalty, Furman held it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that 
created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner."). 
100. See supra note 20. 
101. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is 
a disproportionate punishment for rape). 
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bility for capital murder is required.102 Certain classes of persons 
are completely excluded from the reach of capital punishment. 103 
Mandatory death penalty laws are prohibited,104 and the jury must 
be allowed to consider mitigating evidence.105 
In order to meet these Eighth Amendment concerns, legisla­
tures bifurcated capital jury trials,lo6 The first phase was designed 
to determine guilt.107 If a defendant was convicted, the second 
phase decided punishment.10B By this separation, the guilt phase 
maintained all of the protections of a trial.109 The sentencing hear­
ing was to assure that only an eligible defendant received a death 
sentence, and that they were able to present any evidence that miti­
gated against death.llo In general, prosecutors were given the same 
freedom from the rules of evidence.1ll 
At the time these laws were enacted, a jury was allowed to 
consider imposing a death sentence as long as the criminal statute 
had a maximum punishment of death.1l2 Statutory aggravating fac­
tors merely were considered sentencing factors, not offense 
elements. l13 
The Supreme Court did not require any specific model for the 
102. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (finding that the death penalty 
requires at least a "reckless indifference to human life"). 
103. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (mentally retarded persons); 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (persons less than sixteen years old); Ford 
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (insane persons). 
104. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (explaining that the 
mandatory death sentence for first degree murder violated the Eighth Amendment). 
105. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606-08 (1978) (holding that a procedure that 
failed to consider a defendant's lack of specific intent to commit murder violated Eighth 
Amendment). 
106. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988) (comparing various 
state schemes). 
107. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1976). 
108. Id. (explaining that a gUilty verdict is followed by a separate evidentiary 
hearing to determine sentence). 
109. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976) ("So long as the evidence 
introduced and the arguments made at the pre-sentence hearing do not prejudice a 
defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions."). 
110. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,971-73 (1994) (describing capital proce­
dures consistent with Eighth Amendment). 
111. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 3593 (c) (2000) ("Information is admissible regardless 
of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials 
except that information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the 
danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury."); cf 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (4) (1993) (requiring that the rules of evidence apply to 
proof of aggravating factors). 
112. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990). 
113. Id. 
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new capital punishment schemes.114 Most procedures restricted eli­
gibility for the death penalty during the sentencing phase after ag­
gravating factors were proven.1IS Subsequently, if proven, the 
death penalty, or some lesser sentence, could be selected.116 
The Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury select the 
punishment.1l7 As long as a jury finds all the elements of capital 
murder beyond a reasonable doubt, a judge may choose between 
death and lesser sentences.118 However, instead of requiring proof 
of all elements of the offense at a trial, many capital schemes left 
proof of aggravating circumstances until the sentencing hearing.119 
In those schemes, the jury must participate as fact finders during 
the punishment hearing to find the existence of at least one statu­
tory aggravating circumstance po 
IV. A CONFLICT OF LAWS 
Until recently, there did not appear to be a conflict between 
traditional sentencing law, modern capital sentencing procedure, 
and the right to a jury trial. If a jurisdiction required proof of a fact 
during the guilt phase of trial, then that fact received all the protec­
tions of the rules of evidence121 and the presumption of inno­
cence.122 However, since proof of at least one statutory aggravating 
circumstance is now considered an element of capital murder,123 
then proving that aggravating circumstance during the sentencing 
phase needs to be reconciled with the constitutional requirements 
of the guilt phase of a trial. 
114. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) ("The Eighth Amendment 
is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its 
sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws. "). 
115. See supra note 20. 
116. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998) ("[I]n the selection phase, 
we have emphasized the need for a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence 
to allow an individualized determination."). 
117. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 462-63. 
118. Id. (holding that a capital sentence may be imposed by a judge). 
119. See supra note 20. 
120. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1999) (holding that a jury must 
find a statutory aggravating circumstance). 
121. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949) (holding that the rules of 
evidence apply at the guilt phase of a criminal trial). 
122. Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1993) (holding that a presumption of 
innocence applies at the guilt phase of a criminal trial). 
123. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2003). 
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A. Ring v. Arizona 
In Walton v. Arizona,124 the United States Supreme Court ap­
proved Arizona's capital punishment scheme allowing a judge to 
make the factual findings necessary before a death sentence could 
be considered. In Arizona, a judge could determine the existence 
of facts narrowing the class of persons eligible for the death pen­
alty.125 The supporting rationale of Walton was that the Arizona 
legislature had set the maximum statutory range of punishment at 
death; therefore, the jury's guilty verdict satisfied the Sixth Amend­
ment right to a jury trial.126 That reasoning was sufficient when the 
focus was on how the legislature worded the statute. 
The attention has since changed from the words of the statute 
to their effect.127 The clear effect of the Arizona statute was to 
make a defendant eligible for the death penalty only after there was 
a finding of at least one fact that narrowed the class of persons eligi­
ble for the death penalty.128 Although the Apprendi majority at­
tempted to distinguish capital findings, by the time of Ring, the 
entire Court was convinced of the irreconcilability of the two 
cases.129 Some felt Walton should be overruled130 and others 
wanted to do away with Apprendi.131 Ring overruled Walton and 
the analysis of Apprendi prevailed.132 
Ring answered the question about the necessity for jury find­
ings, but raised other issues. One question raised by Ring was 
whether the statutory aggravating circumstances in capital cases are 
actually offense elements.133 The Ring Court called statutory ag­
gravating circumstances "the functional equivalent of an ele­
124. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990). 
125. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 594-95 (2002). 
126. Id. at 602 (finding that the Arizona legislature gave first degree murder a 
maximum sentence of death). 
127. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000) ("[I]nquiry is not one of 
form, but of effect ...."). 
128. Ring, 536 U.S. at 604. 
129. Id. at 609 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and 
Thomas, JJ.); id. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. 
at 619-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J. dissenting). 
130. Id. at 609 ("Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable ...."); id. at 613 (Ken­
nedy, J., concurring) ("Apprendi is now the law ...."); id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring 
in judgment) (relying on the Eighth Amendment). 
131. Id. at 619-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Yet in choosing which to overrule, 
I would choose Apprendi, not Walton."). 
132. Id. at 609 ("Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a 
sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary 
for imposition of the death penalty."). 
133. Id. at 598. 
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ment,"134 but it was unclear whether the Court meant there was a 
difference between an element and a "functional equivalent," or 
whether the Court was simply uncomfortable with referring to 
elements. 
B. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania 
In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, Justice Scalia, writing for three 
members of the Court, stated that before Apprendi and Ring "capi­
tal-sentencing procedures were understood to be just that: sentenc­
ing proceedings."135 Justice Scalia then explained that until the 
elements of the greater offense of capital murder are proven, a de­
fendant is only exposed to the underlying lesser offense of mur­
der.136 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Scalia in 
holding that whether it is called a sentencing hearing or not, the 
protections of a trial apply to proving elements of a capital crime.137 
The dissent agreed.138 Justice Ginsberg, writing for Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer stated, "This Court has determined ... 
that for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, capital sentencing 
proceedings involving proof of one or more aggravating factors are 
to be treated as trials of separate offenses, not merely sentencing 
proceedings."139 Therefore, seven members of the Supreme Court 
clearly stated that statutory aggravating circumstances are elements 
of capital murder.140 
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor did not join in either state­
134. Id. ("Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense."') (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 494 (2000)). 
135. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2003) (holding that to bar a 
death sentence on retrial, a defendant must be acquitted of capital elements). 
136. Id. at 111. 
137. Id. This is consistent with Apprendi's rule of looking to the effect of the 
finding, and not legislative labels. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000). 
138. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 126 n.6 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
139. Id. 
140. See United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2004). 
In Ring, the Supreme Court held that the aggravating factors necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty under Arizona's analogous state death penalty 
act were elements of a capital crime, such that they had to be submitted to a 
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt in conformity with the reasoning 
of Apprendi. 
Id. (emphasis added); Esparza v. Mitchell, 310 F.3d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 2002), rev'd on 
other grounds, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (recognizing that a majority of the Supreme Court 
has reached this view). 
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ment. They both dissented in Apprendi. 141 In Ring, Justice Ken­
nedy grudgingly accepted Apprendi,142 while Justice O'Connor 
continued to reject Apprendi and its progeny.J43 However, they 
both apparently believe, despite their objections, that Ring and Sat­
tazahn hold that proof of at least one aggravating circumstance is 
now treated as an element of capital murder. Therefore, the Court 
is unanimous. Like it or not, statutory aggravating circumstances 
are capital elements.144 
Every federal court that has reviewed this issue after Sattazahn 
has agreed that proof of at least one statutory aggravating circum­
stance is necessary to prove a capital crime.145 Courts have also 
applied the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment to federal 
capital cases even though the federal capital statutes require only 
written notice of the intent to seek the death penalty.146 
Before the Supreme Court's decisions in Ring and Sattazahn, it 
was possible to say that the relaxed evidentiary standards approved 
by the Supreme Court for capital sentencing hearings applied to 
statutory aggravating circumstances147 and that no presumption of 
innocence was necessary.148 It is now clear that a defendant is eligi­
ble for the death penalty only after he has been convicted of all the 
141. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 460, 523-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, 
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., and Breyer, J.). 
142. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
143. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 116-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I do not join Part 
III, which would further extend the reach of Apprendi ... because I continue to believe 
that case was wrongly decided."). 
144. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. 2519,2524 (2004) ("Ring held that, because 
Arizona's statutory aggravators restricted [as a matter of state law] the class of death­
eligible defendants, those aggravators effectively were elements for federal constitu­
tional purposes, and so were subject to the procedural requirements the Constitution 
attaches to trial of elements.") (emphasis added). 
145. See United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 140-41 (2nd Cir. 2004); Esparza v. 
Mitchell, 310 F.3d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 
970,974-76 (W.D. Tenn. 2003); United States v. Sampson, 245 F. Supp. 2d 327, 332-33 
(D. Mass. 2003); United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); 
United States v. Denis, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1254 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
146. See Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 978-79; Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 146; 
Denis, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 1255; Sampson, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 332; United States v. Re­
gan, 221 F. Supp 2d 672, 674 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 
672, 675 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 478-79 (D. Vt. 
2002). 
147. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 (1976) ("We think desirable for the jury 
to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing 
decision."). 
148. Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278 (1993) ("Once the defendant has been 
convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the trial, the presumption of innocence 
disappears.") . 
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elements of capital murder, including at least one statutory aggra­
vating circumstance.149 The next question is whether due process 
requires that, during proof of those elements, a defendant receive 
the protections of the rules of evidence and the presumption of 
mnocence. 
V. EFFECT OF RING AND SATTAZAHN 
The obvious effect of Ring and Sattazahn is that in many juris­
dictions the elements of capital crimes are not addressed until the 
sentencing hearing. A review of the practical differences between 
the proof of guilt and the determination of punishment demon­
strates the irrationality and unconstitutionality of these procedures. 
A. Rules of Evidence 
Rules of evidence began to develop in sixteenth century En­
gland when judges started admitting oral testimony during jury tri­
als.150 Before that time, verdicts were based on jurors' own 
knowledge, with the assistance of legal documents.151 As one com­
mentator described the early development of oral testimony, "the 
absence of clear rules as to admissibility of evidence, and as to the 
conduct of a trial, were used to give advantages to the crown."152 
By the time the Framers began drafting the United States Con­
stitution, four exclusionary rules of criminal evidence were firmly in 
place in English common law: the character rule, the corroboration 
rule, the confession rule, and the hearsay rule.153 The character rule 
prevented the prosecution from introducing evidence of the defen­
dant's bad character, especially evidence of former crimes, except 
by way of rebuttal. The corroboration rule required evidence in 
addition to that of the accomplice in order for the jury to convict. 
The confession rule excluded evidence that the accused had made 
in an out-of-court confession of the crime, unless the confession was 
voluntary. The hearsay rule rejected testimony by one person 
about what another person said when that testimony was offered to 
prove the truth of the out-of-court statemenU54 
149. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2002). 
150. 9 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 126 (Methuen 
& Co. Ltd. et al. eds., 1926) (1966). 
151. !d. at 131. 
152. Id. at 224. 
153. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGiNS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 179 
(Oxford University Press 2003). 
154. Id. 
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The evolution of these rules has varied. The character rule has 
continued to this day.I55 The accomplice rule exists in many states, 
but not the federal courts.I56 The confession rule was made a con­
stitutional right.I57 The hearsay rule, as it applies to testimonial evi­
dence in a criminal case, also has constitutional protection.158 
The importance, however, is not in what form these rules sur­
vive, but in the Framers' understanding of the need for exclusionary 
rules of evidence for the protection of criminal defendants.159 The 
creation of such rules occurred shortly before the time the Constitu­
tion and the Bill of Rights were born. As the Supreme Court 
stated: 
Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience in 
the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Con­
stitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our 
system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust 
convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and 
property.I60 
The above quote is another way of saying that the rules of evi­
dence are essential to protect rights that are specifically stated in 
the Constitution. The rules of evidence have a significance similar 
to Miranda warnings.I61 Although Miranda warnings are not them­
selves a protection stated in the Constitution, they are necessary to 
155. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948) ("Courts that follow 
the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the 
prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish a 
probability of his guilt."). 
156. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917) (no absolute rule 
preventing convictions based on the testimony of accomplices). 
157. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1963) (holding conviction cannot be 
based upon coerced confession). 
158. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004) (Confrontation Clause 
bars statements by unavailable witnesses who were not previously subject to cross­
examination). 
159. From the standpoint of modern comparative law, what is distinctive 
about the Anglo-American law of evidence is its exclusionary character, that 
is, its undertaking to deal with suspect classes of proof by excluding the evi­
dence from the jury, rather than allowing such weaknesses to affect credit as in 
most modern Continental practice. 
LANGBEIN, supra note 153, at 250. 
160. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (comparing need for 
rules of evidence at trial with an evidentiary hearing). 
161. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring law enforcement to 
warn suspects before taking custodial statements). 
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enforce the right against self-incrimination.162 
Rules of evidence now apply during the guilt phase in all crimi­
nal jury trials.163 Except for some who commit misdemeanors and 
petty offenses, all defendants have the right to jury trials. l64 
The rules of evidence are rules of limitation.165 They restrict 
the quality of evidence that a proponent may introduce.166 A pros­
ecutor is the proponent of evidence when proving elements of a 
crime.167 A criminal defendant is the opponent. Therefore, when a 
prosecutor seeks to prove capital elements, the government bene­
fits from the absence of rules of evidence, while the defendant suf­
fers from their 10ss.168 Unlike sentencing rules, rules of evidence do 
not merely depend upon a judge's individual sense of fairness. 169 
They exclude certain evidence as a matter of law.170 
1. Relevance 
There is a difference in substance between evidence at the guilt 
phase of a trial and information presented at a sentencing hear­
ing. l7l That distinction can best be viewed through the evidentiary 
concept of relevance.172 "'Relevant evidence' means evidence hav­
ing any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse­
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
162. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440-41 n.6 (2000) (holding Consti­
tution requires Miranda warnings in order to secure Fifth Amendment rights). 
163. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) ("Tribunals passing on the 
guilt of a defendant always have been hedged in by strict evidentiary procedural 
limitations. "). 
164. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (noting the right to jury trial for 
sentences exceeding six months). 
165. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE 
COMMON LAW 264 (1898) ("This excluding function is the characteristic one in our law 
of evidence."). 
166. See FED. R. EVID. 103 (rules admit or exclude evidence). 
167. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,175 (1987) ("Evidence is placed 
before the jury when it satisfies the technical requirements of the evidentiary 
Rules...."). 
168. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 860 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
169. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (explaining how sentenc­
ing hearing is a less exacting procedure than proof of guilt). 
170. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) ("In addition to the histori­
cal basis ... there are sound practical reasons for the distinction. "). 
171. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993) ("Traditionally, sentencing 
judges have considered a wide variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing on guilt 
in determining what sentence to impose on a convicted defendant."). 
172. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988) (discussing how rele­
vance exists as a relation between an item of evidence and the matter to be proven). 
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probable than it would be without the evidence."173 Some evidence 
is of consequence to guilt and other information relates to punish­
ment, but very often the two purposes are exc1usive.174 
For instance, proof of a prior conviction is sometimes an ele­
ment of an offenseP5 Prior crimes are also important in deciding 
an appropriate punishment.176 In some situations, a prior convic­
tion may be relevant to both phases of a trial.177 
However, the reverse is not true. Punishment information is 
not necessarily relevant to proving guiltP8 Whether or not the de­
fendant used illegal drugs is not relevant evidence to prove whether 
or not he robbed a bankp9 It makes guilt no more or less proba­
ble. The information may have some value when assessing a sen­
tence, but it is not relevant to determine whether the defendant 
robbed a bank.180 
"[W]here the jury has sentencing responsibilities in a capital 
trial, many issues that are irrelevant to the guilt-innocence determi­
nation step into the foreground and require consideration at the 
sentencing phase."181 A great deal of information that is com­
pletely acceptable at a sentencing hearing would never be properly 
admitted during a trial, capital or noncapital.1 82 
Even relevant evidence may unfairly prejudice a jury against a 
defendant.183 Rules of evidence protect criminal defendants from 
exposure to certain types of information that have been deemed 
173. FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Definition of 'Relevant Evidence"'). 
174. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373,401-02 (1999) (finding victim impact 
is relevant to selection phase of capital sentencing). 
175. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 922(g)(1) (2000) (felon in possession of a firearm). 
176. United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1938) (uncharged rob­
beries could be considered at sentencing). 
177. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (prior offenses may 
trigger sentencing enhancements). 
178. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (traditionally, sentencing 
evidence was "largely unlimited"). This case has been superseded by statute as stated 
in United States v. Waford, 894 F.2d 665, 667 (4th Cir. 1990), United States v. Bushert, 
997 F.2d. 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 1993), and United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1212 
(11th Cir. 1989) (stating that due to the Sentencing Reform Act, judges are no longer 
"largely unlimited" in what they may consider when deciding sentence). 
179. United States v. Madden, 38 F.3d 747, 752 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e do not 
believe that evidence of occasional drug use should be admitted; financial need is the 
key element to establish motive."). 
180. Id. (testimony merely "tars Madden as a drug user in the eyes of the jury"). 
181. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163 (1994) (instruction on parole 
ineligibility was required to answer argument of future dangerousness). 
182. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1,6 (1994) (finding admission of prior death 
sentence allowed). 
183. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (holding that the iden­
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unfairly prejudicial to proving guilt.184 
2. Character Evidence 
Unfair prejudice occurs at a trial when a defendant is harmed 
by violations of the rules of evidence.18s The best example of preju­
dicial evidence that has been limited by rule is character evi­
dence.186 The rules of evidence generally prohibit the introduction 
of extrinsic acts that might adversely reflect on the actor's charac­
ter, unless that evidence bears upon a relevant issue in the case such 
as motive, opportunity, or knowledge.187 However, at a sentencing 
hearing, virtually all facets of a defendant's character are rele­
vant.188 Although the defendant's propensity to commit crime is 
generally a legitimate sentencing concern, it is prohibited at a 
trial.189 
One exception the Supreme Court has made to the general 
prohibition against admitting prior acts is when a statute makes 
proof of a prior conviction an element of the offense.190 However, 
proof of the prior conviction at trial is limited to the conviction it­
self, not the underlying facts.191 The Court has referred to the ap­
plication of the rules of evidence as one of the procedural 
tity of defendant's prior felony was unfairly prejudicial when defendant agreed to its 
existence ). 
184. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 860 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Rules 
of evidence are also weighted in the defendant's favor. For example, the prosecution 
generally cannot introduce evidence of the defendant's character to prove his propen­
sity to commit a crime, but the defendant can introduce such reputation evidence to 
show his law-abiding nature."). 
185. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180-81. 
186. See FED. R. EVID. 404 ("Character Evidence Not Admissible To Prove Con­
duct; Exceptions; Other Crimes"). 
187. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988) ("The threshold in­
quiry a court must make before admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is 
whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other than character."). 
188. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976) ("wide scope of evidence"). 
189. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181 ("Although ... 'propensity evidence' is relevant, 
the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged-or that, uncertain of 
guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment-creates a preju­
dicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance." (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681 
F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982»). 
190. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967) (upholding recidivist statute that 
required proof of prior convictions at trial). 
191. Id. at 562-63 ("The evidence itself is usually, and in recidivist cases almost 
always, of a documentary kind, and in the cases before us there is no claim that its 
presentation was in any way inflammatory."). 
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safeguards making recidivist statutes constitutional.192 
The exclusion of bad acts evidence is founded not on a belief that 
the evidence is irrelevant, but rather on a fear that juries will 
tend to give it excessive weight, and on a fundamental sense that 
no one should be convicted of a crime based on his or her previ­
ous misdeeds.193 
At a trial, "similar acts evidence is to be considered only for 
the proper purpose for which it was admitted."194 When that evi­
dence is offered merely to prove that the defendant has a bad char­
acter, it must be excluded.195 
Propensity and character evidence are routinely used during a 
sentencing hearing.196 It is relevant and admissible to show that a 
convicted defendant deserves a more severe punishment because 
the defendant's history indicates he is likely to commit future 
crimes.197 It is as difficult to imagine a sentencing hearing without 
propensity and character evidence as it is to conceive of a trial 
where a defendant is alleged to be guilty based solely on unrelated 
past conduct or the quality of his character. 
The Supreme Court has been careful to exclude unnecessary 
prejudicial information when it might taint a jury verdict.198 This 
rule goes back to common law199 and has been incorporated into 
due process protections in the Constitution.20o However, at sen­
tencing, prior crimes need only be proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence,201 including offenses that previously resulted in 
192. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 725 (1998) (upholding California "three­
strikes" law). 
193. United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (deciding en­
hancement for prior crime did not need to be severed). 
194. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 
(1998). 
195. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (character not admissible to prove action in 
conformity therewith, unless first raised by the accused). 
196. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949, 951 (1983) (allowing defendant's racial 
hatred to be considered); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1982) (defen­
dant's youth is a consideration); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949) 
(defendant's background generally may be considered). 
197. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1994) (future dangerous­
ness is admissible). 
198. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181-82 (1997) (identity of prior 
felony excluded). 
199. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948). 
200. United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1998). 
201. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994) (noting that prior criminal 
acts need only be proven by preponderance of evidence to be used to enhance 
sentence). 
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acquittals.202 
At a capital sentencing hearing, the examination of a defen­
dant's character is even more complex. Psychiatric evidence that 
the defendant will commit future crimes is admissible.203 Lay wit­
ness testimony of future dangerousness is also admissible.204 Even 
the defendant's "low rehabilitative potential" may be introduced.205 
Such evidence would never be admitted during the guilt phase 
of a tria1.206 Beyond the obvious notion of unfair prejudice, predic­
tions of future behavior are simply not relevant to any element of a 
criminal offense.207 Thus, it is not probative to any issue of guilt.20B 
3. Victim Impact Information 
There are instances where the effect upon a victim is relevant 
to proving offense elements.209 For instance, bodily injury or finan­
cialloss may be elements of an offense. However, evidence regard­
ing the impact of the crime on third persons is never relevant at the 
guilt stage of trial.2l0 Defense counsel has even been found to be 
ineffective for failure to object to the admission of such victim im­
pact evidence during a trial.211 
At a capital sentencing hearing, it is common to introduce in­
formation about the effect of the victim's loss upon others.212 Sur­
viving family members have been allowed to read poems of "deep 
202. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (holding acquitted conduct 
is admissible at sentencing). 
203. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-97 (1983); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 
262, 272-73 (1976). 
204. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 355-56 (1993) (numerous witnesses testi­
fied to defendant's previous acts of violence). 
205. United States v. Spivey, 958 F.Supp. 1523, 1535 (D. N.M. 1997); see also 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT MODEL DEATH PENALTY JURY INSTRUcnONS 12.08 (Nonstatutory 
Aggravating Factors) (2003). 
206. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163 (1994) ("jury is not free to 
convict a defendant simply because he poses a future danger"). 
207. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,689 (1988) (noting extrinsic acts 
reflecting upon an actor's character are generally prohibited). 
208. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,181-82 (1997) (deciding identity of 
prior felony was unfairly prejudicial at trial). 
209. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 (1999) (proof of death or 
serious bodily injury). 
210. See United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545-46 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 989 (1994) (error to admit victims' testimony about harm to their health and 
savings during trial). 
211. Sager V. Maass, 907 F.Supp 1412, 1421 (D. Or. 1995), affd, 84 F.3d 1212 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
212. Jones, 527 U.S. at 401 (victim impact may be relevant in every capital sen­
tencing hearing). 
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sadness and regret."213 In the Oklahoma City bombing trial, the 
government presented evidence of family members' last contacts 
with the deceased victims, the trauma of efforts to discover the vic­
tims' fates, the impact on learning of their deaths, the histories of 
the victims, the innocence of child victims, and the overall impact 
on the surviving families. 214 Evidence of the victims' religious activ­
ities has also been permitted.215 
Showing the potential effect on prison employees, who will be 
responsible for the defendant, has been allowed.216 The latent risk 
to others from a capital defendant's actions is a proper basis to con­
sider imposing the death penalty.217 
4. Hearsay 
A further difference between proving guilt and determining 
punishment is the use of hearsay evidence. Subject to limited excep­
tions, hearsay is not allowed to prove a defendant's guilt at a 
trial,218 Hearsay is another example of limited admissibility evi­
dence.219 A hearing that allows hearsay is entirely different in na­
ture from a trial that requires the declarant to testify, subject to 
limited exceptions.22o It is unclear whether the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment even applies to the sentencing.221 
213. United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 818 (4th Cir. 2000) (victim impact 
reviewed only for bias and caprice). 
214. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1219 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The devas­
tating effects that the deaths of the victims had on their families and loved ones is 
'certainly part and parcel of the circumstances' of the crime properly presented to the 
jury at the penalty phase of trial."). 
215. United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 479-80 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Because 
religion played a vital role in Todd and Stacie Bagleys' lives, it would be impossible to 
describe their 'uniqueness as individual human beings' without reference to their 
faith."). 
216. Q. If the jury were to impose the death penalty in this case, do you have 
an opinion about what impact that would have on ... the operation of USP 
Atlanta in terms of the staff and security issues that you have there? A. [Of­
ficer Hawkins] I believe that this would send a very clear signal to the inmates 
and staff members as well that you cannot commit this type of infraction. You 
cannot kill a staff member and just absolutely nothing be done about it. 
United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1999). 
217. Alabama v. Evans, 461 U.S. 230,232 (1983) (defendant "knowingly created a 
great risk of death to many persons"). 
218. Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 22-23 (1976) (holding informant's hear­
say statement was not admissible to support conviction). 
219. See, e.g., FED R. EVID. 802 ("Hearsay Rule"). 
220. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1999) (contrasting trial and sen­
tencing procedures). 
221. United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 324 (4th. Cir. 2003). 
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If it does, then a great deal of traditional sentencing evidence would 
be barred.222 
A sentencing hearing is a procedure that gives the jury or judge 
complete information about a defendant and the effect of the crime 
for which the defendant has been convicted.223 Hearsay is admissi­
ble and welcome during sentencing hearings,224 Presentence re­
ports, police reports, out-of-court witness statements, and other 
second-hand information is regularly admitted at a sentencing 
hearing.225 
5. Application of Rules 
A good example of a pre-Ring case examining the application 
of the rules of evidence to a capital sentencing hearing is United 
States v. Pitera.226 In Pitera, the district court rejected the applica­
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence during a capital sentencing 
hearing, finding that the rules only applied to proof at the guilt 
phase.227 Pursuant to Walton, that was the proper ruling in 1992.228 
Proof of statutory aggravating factors were not considered to be 
elements of a capital case and therefore, did not have the protection 
of the rules of evidence. It was not until Ring that it became clear 
that capital elements and traditional sentencing considerations were 
unhappily married in one proceeding.229 Today, the same reasoning 
222. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004) (Confrontation 
Clause bars statements by unavailable witnesses who were not previously subject to 
cross-examination). 
223. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). 
224. Id. at 251. 
225. Id. at 249-50. 
226. 795 F. Supp. 546, 564-65 (E.D. N.Y. 1992). 
The Federal Rules of Evidence are critical to the conduct of criminal trials to 
enable "truth [to] be ascertained and proceedings [to be] justly determined." 
But the focus of a trial is singular: "whether a defendant is guilty of having 
engaged in criminal conduct of which he has been specifically accused." ... An 
individualized consideration of sentence, by contrast, necessitates a broader 
inquiry into all aspects of the defendant's life and the crime committed. A 
simple example best illustrates why the concerns of the two proceedings are 
not best served by the Federal Rules of Evidence. At trial, a jury generally 
cannot consider evidence of a defendant's past criminal conduct in deciding 
whether he has committed the charged offense. That precise evidence is, how­
ever, deemed highly probative at sentencing. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
227. Id. at 565-66. 
228. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
229. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (overruling Walton). 
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in Pitera - that only elements of the crime require the rules of evi­
dence - produces an opposite conclusion. 
If the rules of evidence apply to trials but not sentencing hear­
ings, then the important issue is whether the determination of capi­
tal elements is properly part of a trial or part of a sentencing 
hearing. The definition does not depend merely upon what the leg­
islature chose to call the proceeding.230 As with the definitions of 
elements and sentencing factors, their meaning depends upon their 
effect.231 The determination of elements is logically a part of the 
guilt phase of triaP2 and requires the rules of a trial. To para­
phrase Justice Scalia, whether it is called a trial, a sentencing hear­
ing "or Mary Jane,"233 if the effect is to prove elements of the 
offense, trial protections should apply. 
An argument exists here because no particular set of rules of 
evidence is constitutionally required. There is no right to proceed 
under any specific set of rules.234 However, this contention misses 
the point. To exclude capital elements from the rules that apply to 
all other criminal trials denies due process of law and has no histori­
cal basis. To do so would also contradict all of the Supreme Court's 
previous Eighth Amendment case law requiring greater reliability 
in capital cases.235 
6. Reliability of Judicial Discretion 
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court found that 
statements from an unavailable witness, offered against a criminal 
defendant, without a previous opportunity for cross examination, 
violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.236 The 
Court rejected the admission of such testimonial evidence, even if a 
judge has deemed it reliable.237 
230. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 454, 550 (2002) (stating that legislatures 
may not merely label every fact a sentencing factor). 
231. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000) (meaning depends upon 
whether effect is to raise maximum punishment). 
232. Ring, 536 U.S. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
233. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
234. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 55 (1996) (holding that rules of evi­
dence may exclude some defense evidence without violating due process). 
235. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) ("We have recognized on 
more than one occasion that the Constitution places special constraints on the proce­
dures used to convict an accused of a capital offense and sentence him to death. The 
finality of the death penalty requires 'a greater degree of reliability' when it is im­
posed.") (citations omitted). 
236. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004). 
237. Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at 
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In doing so, the Court examined the historical basis for the 
Confrontation Clause and the abuses it sought to avoid. As an ex­
ample, the Court pointed to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 
1603.238 He was convicted upon a letter read by the prosecutor to 
the jury. In A History of English Law, W. S. Holdsworth examined 
Raleigh's trial and stated: 
It is clear that this new fashion of examining witnesses for the 
crown, and, in light of their depositions, elaborately preparing 
the case against the prisoner, enormously increased the severity 
of the rules which refused him a copy of the indictment, refused 
him professional advice, and refused to allow him to call wit­
nesses. And these advantages possessed by the crown pressed all 
the more hardly on him, because, as we have seen, the modern 
rules of evidence hardly as yet existed.239 
Rules of evidence protect criminal defendants, who would oth­
erwise be left to the discretion of the trial judge. As the Supreme 
Court stated in Crawford: 
We have no doubt the courts below were acting in utmost good 
faith when they found reliability. The Framers, however, would 
not have been content to indulge this assumption. They knew 
that judges, like other government officers, could not always be 
trusted to safeguard the rights of the people; the likes of the 
dread Lord Jeffreys were not yet too distant a memory. They 
were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands.24o 
Simply leaving the admission of evidence to a trial judge's 
sense of reliability offends the very reason why the rules of evi­
dence were developed. If a defendant has the right to have the ele­
ments proven, subject to the rules of evidence and the presumption 
of innocence, then this right cannot be avoided simply by placing 
the proof of some elements during a sentencing hearing. 
B. Unitary Proceeding 
Unlike anywhere else III criminal law, many death penalty 
odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is 
to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive 
guarantee. It commands, not that the evidence be reliable, but that reliability 
be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross­
examination. 
Id. at 1370. 
238. Id. at 1360. 
239. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 150, at 228. 

240.. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1373. 
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schemes combine trial and sentencing evidence in a single proceed­
ing.241 A jury hears all the evidence at once and decides the issues 
during one deliberation.242 No distinction is made between the evi­
dence offered to prove the capital elements and information of­
fered regarding the appropriate punishment.243 
The Supreme Court has previously recognized that proof of 
guilt and the determination of punishment in capital cases should 
be separate: 
When a human life is at stake and when the jury must have infor­
mation prejudicial to the question of guilt but relevant to the 
question of penalty in order to impose a rational sentence, a bi­
furcated system is more likely to ensure elimination of the consti­
tutional deficiencies identified in Furman [v. Georgia ].244 
Since legislatures voluntarily created bifurcated capital 
schemes, the Court never had to decide whether a unitary capital 
trial and sentencing hearing could satisfy Furman. However, be­
cause the jury's decision at the sentencing hearing is now the 
equivalent to a guilty verdict of capital murder, a valid segregation 
of guilt and punishment evidence is necessary.245 
In other contexts, problems of prejudice are often addressed by 
limiting instructions.246 However, limiting instructions given during 
a capital sentencing hearing will not work. The jury will hear all the 
sentencing evidence at one proceeding. The jury cannot receive ev­
idence about punishment and then mentally put it aside while they 
consider proof of the capital elements.247 A limiting instruction 
that requires a jury to view a defendant as innocent with respect to 
some factual findings, but guilty as to others, requires overcoming a 
241. See supra note 20. 
242. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373,385 (1999) (describing federal capital 
procedures). 
243. Id. at 386; see also Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 609 (2002) (holding 
that a fact increasing the minimum penalty without exceeding the maximum penalty 
was appropriately found as a sentencing element by a judge rather than an offense 
element to be determined by the jury). 
244. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,191-92 (1976) (explaining reasoning for bi­
furcated capital trials). 
245. Dissenting in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2546 (2004), Justice 
O'Connor pointed out that the rule prohibiting character evidence during the guilt 
phase of a trial might now require legislatures to bifurcate non-capital trials, when a 
defendant's prior acts will increase the sentence. Id. 
246. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 105 ("Limited Admissibility"). 
247. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,131 (1968) (quoting People v. Aranda, 
63 Cal. 2d 518, 528-29 (1965» (finding jurors cannot merely ignore prejudicial 
information). 
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level of cognitive dissonance tolerated nowhere else in jury trials.248 
In Jackson v. Denno, the Supreme Court struck down a state 
court procedure, which submitted the issue of the voluntariness of a 
confession to a trial jury.249 Under the procedure, if a jury found 
the confession was involuntary, the jurors were then expected to 
ignore the statement while deliberating about the defendant's 
guilt.250 The Court found this untenable.251 Jurors are simply not 
capable of ignoring such obviously damaging evidence. Not only 
would the procedure merely mask the unfair prejUdice to the defen­
dant,252 it would be impossible to present the issue on appeal be­
cause there would be no way to measure if jurors improperly relied 
on the statement in order to convict.253 
The procedure in Denno is analogous to the situation faced by 
juries in many capital procedures. At a capital sentencing hearing, 
the jury is given evidence regarding offense elements and informa­
tion supporting punishment.254 When jurors deliberate on those is­
sues at the same time, they cannot be expected to disregard the 
punishment information while deciding guilt. 
In Bruton v. United States, the Supreme Court found that it 
was insufficient to instruct a jury to limit its consideration of a con­
fession to only one of two defendants when the statement incrimi­
nated both.255 The statement in Bruton was an admission by one 
248. See id. at 135 (limiting instruction cannot cure all prejudice). 
249. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 396 (1964). 
250. Id. at 374-75. 
251. Due process of law requires that a coerced confession be excluded from 
consideration by the jury. It also requires that the issue of coercion be tried by 
an unprejudiced trier, and, regardless of the pious fictions indulged by the 
courts, it is useless to contend that a juror who has heard the confession can be 
uninfluenced by his opinion as to the truth or falsity of it. 
Id. at 383-84 n.lO. 
252. It is impossible to discover whether the jury found the confession volun­
tary and relied upon it, or involuntary and supposedly ignored it. Nor is there 
any indication of how the jury resolved disputes in the evidence concerning 
the critical facts underlying the coercion issue. Indeed, there is nothing to 
show that these matters were resolved at all, one way or the other. 
Id. at 379-80. 
253. Id. at 380 ("Being cloaked by the general verdict, petitioners do not know 
what result they really are attacking here.") (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 
177-78 (1953». 
254. See supra note 20. 
255. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968) ("[T]he risk that the 
jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure 
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system 
cannot be ignored."). 
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defendant but hearsay as to the other.256 It met no exception to the 
rule against hearsay. If the latter defendant had been tried alone 
there was no question the statement would have been excluded.257 
The Court found that the government could not benefit by their 
joint trial in order to use otherwise inadmissible evidence.258 
Rather than teing told to completely disregard prejudicial evi­
dence, capital jurors would be expected to make use of the informa­
tion, but only for the limited purpose of selecting the 
punishment.259 In Bruton, this type of mental exercise was found to 
be impossible. The remedy in Bruton was to conduct separate tri­
als.260 In capital cases, the remedy is to separate proof of guilt from 
proof supporting punishment. No limiting instruction can correct 
that structural defect.261 
Courts have often relied on statements of common sense to 
condemn such procedures: "one 'cannot unring a bell'; 'after the 
thrust of the saber it is difficult to say forget the wound'; and .. .'if 
you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can't instruct the jury not 
to smell it."'262 As the Supreme Court quoted one juror, "You can't 
forget what you hear and see."263 
Individual judges have stated the problem in their own words. 
Justice Robert Jackson said, "The naive assumption that prejudicial 
effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing 
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."264 Judge Learned Hand 
stated that the limiting instruction is a "recommendation to the jury 
of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but 
anybody's else. "265 
Social science has confirmed the validity of these sayings. Ju­
rors view a trial as a cohesive story, not a collection of separate 
256. Id. at 126 n.2. 
257. Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 22-23 (1976) (stating unreliable hearsay 
may not be basis for a criminal conviction). 
258. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137 (reversed for new trial). 
259. Id. at 131 ("A jury cannot segregate evidence into separate intellectual 
boxes.") (quoting People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 528-29 (1965». 
260. Id. at 137 (prejudice could not be cured by limiting instruction). 
261. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 336 (1985) (finding jury must not 
be misled regarding the role it plays at capital sentencing). 
262. Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1962) (prosecutor's 
opening statement claimed the case was the most flagrant fraud ever in district). 
263. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (stating jury should not have a 
preconceived notion of the defendant's gUilt). 
264. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur­
ring) (admission of hearsay statements voided conviction). 
265. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932). 
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issues.266 A court may tell a jury to limit what it considers, but once 
that information has been heard, each juror will weigh the informa­
tion anyway to resolve the issues.267 
A procedure may involve "such a probability that prejudice 
will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process."268 
Other than outside influences, like publicity,269 some trial practices 
have been held to deny due process. 
In Turner v. Louisiana, the two principal witnesses for the 
prosecution in a death penalty case were deputy sheriffs responsible 
for sequestering the jury.270 Even though there was no showing 
that either deputy discussed the case in the jurors' presence, 
prejudice was presumed.271 Actions by judges272 and prosecutors273 
266. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234-35 (1978); see also W. LANCE 
BENNETI & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: 
JUSTICE AND JUDGEMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 149 (1981) ("Instead of viewing the 
trial as a black box in which any number of separate factors operate in mysterious ways, 
the story perspective shows how those factors enter the judgment process and how they 
can operate together to affect trial outcomes."). 
267. Our theory shows how ordinary means of telling and interpreting stories 
are used in trials to assess the credibility of competing claims. This perspective 
views the formal rules of the court as ritual that facilitates the presentation of 
a case but does not dictate its interpretation. In other words, the formal pro­
cedures limit the information that will be perceived as relevant to a story, but 
within the range of admissible information, the actual presentation and inter­
pretation of cases depend primarily on the storytelling and storyhearing abili­
ties of the courtroom actors (i.e., judge, jurors, defense, prosecutor, witnesses). 
The use of stories to reconstruct the evidence in cases casts doubt on the com­
mon belief about justice as a mechanical and objective process. 
BENNETI & FELDMAN, supra note 266, at ix. 
268. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,542-43 (1965) (live radio and televised proceed­
ings required reversal even absent a showing of actual prejudice); see also Tumey v. 
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). 
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average 
man ... to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or 
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the 
State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law. 
Id. 
269. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 338-40 (1966) (jurors exposed to 
publicity of defendant's character and prior acts); Estes, 381 U.S. at 542-43 (national 
publicity); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 725 (1963) (film of defendant's confession 
was broadcast pretrial); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1961) (publicity revealed 
defendant's criminal history and confession). 
270. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1965) ("The failure to accord an 
accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process."). 
271. Id. at 472-74 ("The requirement that a jury's verdict 'must be based upon the 
evidence developed at the trial' goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced 
in the constitutional concept of trial by jury."). 
272. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 134-39 (1955) (holding violation of due 
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have also been held to be inherently prejudicial when it was obvi­
ous they could not be ignored. 
Additionally, whenever a capital defendant presents mitigating 
evidence, the government may rebut that evidence.274 That rebut­
tal evidence will also be considered by the jury at the same time it 
considers the capital elements and the non-statutory aggravating 
evidence.275 There is no separation, nor can there be, in a single 
proceeding. Therefore, anytime a capital defendant puts on miti­
gating evidence there is not only a risk of facing rebuttal evidence, 
which is not subject to the restrictions of the rules of evidence, but 
that the rebuttal evidence may also influence the jury to convict on 
the capital elements. 
Courts do have some experience limiting the effects of prejudi­
cial evidence.276 Even absent rules of evidence, judges may still ex­
clude prejudicial evidence.277 The question is whether it is possible 
for courts to allow the introduction of traditional sentencing evi­
dence and still protect capital defendants from the type of prejudi­
cial information prohibited at trial. 
It is difficult to imagine how an effective instruction, cautioning 
against combining proof of guilt with the determination of sentence, 
could be worded. Capital jury instructions do not prescribe which 
evidence goes with which issues, nor can they.278 The prosecution's 
first witness might be a family member of the victim, whose testi­
mony only concerns how much the victim meant to her, or the pros­
ecution's first witness might be a government-retained psychiatrist 
offering the opinion that the defendant is likely to commit future 
acts of violence. The first witness might be a police officer detailing 
the defendant's prior arrests and other bad conduct. 
In many cases, a prosecutor will present no new evidence, rele­
vant to the capital elements, at the sentencing hearing. In those 
cases, nothing but punishment information will be introduced. 
process when judge acted as judge in grand jury and trial judge during contempt 
prosecution). 
273. United States v. Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636, 640 (6th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor intro­
duced witness's disavowed, unsworn prior statements to impeach his claimed lack of 
memory). 
274. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). 
275. Id. 
276. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 105 ("Limited Admissibility"). 
277. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 3593(c) (2001) ("[s]pecial hearing to determine whether 
a sentence of death is justified"). 
278. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 199 (1998) (error in instructions 
must be evaluated in context of the entire instructions). 
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Thus, none of the proof at the sentencing hearing will be relevant to 
the capital elements. The jury may have to sit through entirely ir­
relevant and prejudicial information before deciding whether the 
defendant is even guilty of capital murder. 
C. Presumption of Innocence 
The presumption of innocence is a basic tenet of American 
law.279 That presumption "is the undoubted law, axiomatic and ele­
mentary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the adminis­
tration of our criminallaw."28o A jury instruction that undermines 
the presumption of innocence is unconstitutional. 281 
No presumption of innocence exists at a sentencing hearing.282 
By definition, defendants may only be sentenced after guilt is deter­
mined. Sentencing considerations which are not elements are thus 
not subject to the Constitution's indictment, jury and proof 
requirements.283 
A jury can hardly presume a defendant is innocent of capital 
murder after the jurors have already deliberated and convicted the 
defendant of murder. This contradiction is compounded by the fact 
that the proceeding during which this will occur is called a "sentenc­
ing hearing."284 This means that unlike any other crime, a capital 
defendant is without the presumption of innocence as to elements 
of the offense.285 The elements in question are the very ones that 
279. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of inno­
cence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial 
under our system of criminal justice."). 
280. [T]here can be no question that the Roman law was pervaded with the 
results of this maxim of criminal administration, as the following extracts 
show: "Let all accusers understand that they are not to prefer charges unless 
they can be proven by proper witnesses or by conclusive documents, or by 
circumstantial evidence which amounts to indubitable proof and is clearer 
than day." 
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-54 (1895). 
281. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1979) (a conclusive pre­
sumption in this case "would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence 
with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the 
crime") (quoting Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274-75(1952». 
282. Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1993) (per curiam) ("Once the defen­
dant has been convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the trial, the presumption of inno­
cence disappears."). 
283. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,554-58 (2002) (not all sentencing fac­
tors are elements). 
284. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376 (1999). 
285. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398-99 (1993) (explaining presumption 
of innocence and constitutional protections attach when crime is charged). 
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make it a capital case.286 
In Taylor v. Kentucky, the defendant was convicted of rob­
bery.287 At trial, he testified that he was not present at the victim's 
home at the time of the robbery.288 Although the trial court gave 
an instruction on reasonable doubt, the defendant's requested in­
struction on the presumption of innocence was denied.289 The Su­
preme Court found that failure to give an instruction on the 
presumption of innocence denied the defendant due process of 
law.290 In reaching this conclusion, the Court weighed aspects of 
the trial that vitiated against the presumption of innocence: the 
prosecutor's argument condemning all defendants, the skeletal rea­
sonable doubt instruction, and the swearing match between victim 
and defendant,291 
Proving capital elements during the sentencing hearing is 
worse than the denial of a jury instruction in Taylor. Not only is a 
capital defendant without the presumption of innocence, but the 
jury is told the defendant is guilty.292 No instruction on reasonable 
doubt can possibly remedy that defect. Even if instructions on the 
presumption of innocence were given regarding the capital ele­
ments, they could not logically overcome the fact that the jury has 
already found the defendant guilty of a murder, or that evidence of 
capital murder is then combined with information supporting a 
death sentence.293 
In Estelle v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that as long as a 
criminal defendant files a timely objection the defendant cannot be 
compelled to stand trial in prison clothing.294 The Court recognized 
that guilt must be established by probative evidence and not as­
286. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2003) (finding murder is a 
lesser included crime of capital murder). 
287. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978) (due process requires that the 
presumption of innocence be honored). 
288. Id. at 480. 
289. Id. at 480-81. 
290. Id. at 490. 
291. Id. at 486-87. 
292. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COMMITIEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCfIONS FOR THE 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INsTRucnoNS FOR THE DIS· 
TRICf COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CiRCUIT, 12.01 (2003) [hereinafter EIGHTH CiRCUIT 
MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INsTRucnoNS] ("Members of the jury, you have unani­
mously found the defendant guilty of the offense as charged in Count [repeat for each 
offense] of the indictment. "). 
293. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526 (1979). 
294. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("To implement the presump­
tion, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding 
process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully guard against 
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sumed by the defendant's status.295 At a sentencing hearing, where 
capital elements are proven, jurors are actually told that the defen­
dant is guilty of the murder before they even decide the elements of 
capital murder.296 
In Beck v. Alabama, the death penalty statute prohibited ju­
rors from considering imposing a conviction for a crime less than 
capital murder.297 The Court found that the unavailability of a 
lesser charge created an unwarranted risk of conviction for capital 
murder.298 In other words, it was unfair to ask jurors to overcome 
their natural tendency to convict when faced with the alternative of 
letting a person they believed to be guilty of a lesser offense go free. 
Under the procedures that resolve capital elements at a sen­
tencing hearing, jurors are similarly led toward conviction. They 
begin with the knowledge that the defendant has already been con­
victed of the murder and must then resolve the capital elements 
while also deciding punishment.299 This comes dangerously close to 
creating a presumption in favor of guilt regarding the capital 
elements.30o 
The importance of those elements is diminished by their place­
ment during the sentencing hearing. Instead of determining guilt of 
capital murder independently, the jury may balance that decision 
against the potential sentence. In other words, they may convict 
the defendant of capital murder knowing that they will simultane­
ously balance that with a life verdict. More ominously, they might 
convict a defendant merely because they know those findings must 
be made in order to also impose a death sentence. 
dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond 
a reasonable doubt.") (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970». 
295. Id. at 504-05. 
296. See, e.g., EIGHTI-I CiRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra 
note 291, at 12.0l. 
297. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 628-29 n.3 (1980) (holding that due process 
requires charge on lesser offense). 
298. In the final analysis the difficulty with the Alabama statute is that it in­
terjects irrelevant considerations into the factfinding process, diverting the 
jury's attention from the central issue of whether the State has satisfied its 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a 
capital crime. 
Id. at 642. 
299. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 386 n.7 (1999) (describing federal capi­
tal sentencing procedures). 
300. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,467 (1943) (holding that due process 
bars a presumption in favor of an element of the prosecution's case); McFarland v. 
American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916) ("[I]t is not within the province of 
a legislature to declare an individual gUilty or presumptively guilty of a crime."). 
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The presumption of innocence is further confused by the de­
fendant's burden at the punishment hearing. While the government 
must prove aggravating circumstances, a defendant has the burden 
of proving mitigating circumstances.30} Even if the standard is only 
a preponderance of evidence and a jury need not be unanimous in 
finding mitigating evidence, the fact that a defendant has some bur­
den of proof will prevent the jury from applying a presumption of 
innocence to the capital elements. 
VI. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ACT 
The Federal Death Penalty Act (hereinafter "FDPA") is an ex­
ample of a scheme in direct conflict with the premise that statutory 
aggravating circumstances must be treated as capital elements.302 
The FDPA is a sentencing statute under which certain enumerated 
federal crimes are eligible for capital punishment.303 The FDPA re­
quires a separate punishment hearing where a jury must determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt (1) whether a defendant had the requi­
site culpable mental state for capital murder304 and (2) whether 
there existed at least one statutory aggravating factor.305 Only then 
is the jury allowed to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors to 
determine punishment.306 
The effect of the statute is that a defendant is not eligible for 
the federal death penalty until a jury has found, beyond a reasona­
ble doubt, the culpable mental state and at least one statutory ag­
gravating factor. 307 Both of those findings are elements of federal 
capital murder.308 
The statute dispenses with the rules of evidence at the sentenc­
ing hearing.309 Section 3593(c) expressly contradicts any effort to 
reconcile the sentencing hearing admissibility standard with the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, by stating unequivocally that in this 
hearing, "[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its admissibility 
under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal tri­
301. 18 U.S.c. § 3593(c) (2000). 
302. 18 U.S.c. §§ 3591-3598 (2000); see also 21 U.S.c. §§ 848(a)-(r) (2000). 
303. 18 U.S.c. § 3592 (2000). 
304. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 493 (2000) ("The defendant's intent in 
committing a crime is perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a core criminal 
offense element.") (quotations omitted). 
305. 18 U.S.c. § 3593(d). 
306. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1999). 
307. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
308. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2003). 
309. 18 U.S.c. § 3593(c). 
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als."310 Thus, in the statute no presumption of innocence is contem­
plated. The very first sentence of the FDPA states, "[a] defendant 
who has been found guilty of ...."311 Therefore, the FDPA explic­
itly prohibits a defendant from receiving the protections of the rules 
of evidence and the presumption of innocence regarding capital 
elements. 
Congress could not have intended that proof of guilt and pun­
ishment be commingled. Congress created this complex sentencing 
procedure at a time when Walton indicated that aggravating factors 
were merely sentencing factors, not offense elements.312 There is 
nothing in the FDPA meant to affect the proof of guilt.313 The only 
procedure in the FDPA that occurs before conviction of the under­
lying murder is when the Attorney General provides notice to the 
defendant that the death penalty will be soughP14 The statute says 
that notice requires no pleading or appearance in court.315 
Amongst other reasons, a trial is meant to protect an innocent 
person from conviction.316 On the other hand, a sentencing hearing 
is used to secure an appropriate sentence for a guilty defendanP17 
Both are different stages in a criminal proceeding, thus requiring 
different protections and seeking different goals. The FDPA con­
fuses these goals. 
A. Facial Challenges 
If there is no procedure that will allow the FDPA to operate as 
it is written, and no discrete portion that may be severed, then it is 
unconstitutional.318 Only Congress has the authority to rewrite the 
310. Id. 
311. 18 U.S.c. § 3591(a) (2000) (emphasis added) (preamble to FDPA). 
312. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
313. 18 U.S.c. § 3591(a) ("[a] defendant who has been found guilty ...."). 
314. 18 U.S.c. § 3593(a) (2000) ("the attorney shall ... serve on the defendant, a 
t · ")no Ice. " . 
315. Id. 
316. See County Court of Ulster v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979) ("[I]n criminal 
cases, the ultimate test of any device's constitutional validity in a given case remains 
constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on 
evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
317. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376 (1999) (holding that a decision to 
seek the death penalty under FDPA is in the government's discretion). 
318. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55-56 n.22 (1999) ("[When] 
vagueness permeates the ordinance, a facial challenge is appropriate."). 
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law.319 
After Ring and Sattazahn, a trial judge in a federal capital case 
has a "Hobson's choice." The judge can restrict the sentencing 
hearing pursuant to the rules of evidence, thereby treating the capi­
tal crime elements like other elements of the charge, or alterna­
tively, the judge can allow relaxed evidentiary standards at 
sentencing. In the former instance, the judge will explicitly violate 
the statute.320 In the latter case, the judge will allow otherwise 
inadmissible evidence to be considered in determining the capital 
elements. 
The problem with the FDPA is that all of the issues are intro­
duced and decided together. Jurors have no idea what distinctions 
there are among the various pieces of evidence they receive. There 
is no reason to believe that compelling testimony about the effect 
on a victim's family, or evidence of the defendant's future danger­
ousness will have an adverse influence on the jury's decision to con­
vict on the capital elements. 
In United States v. Jackson, the Supreme Court considered 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges to a sentencing provision 
that authorized the death penalty only upon a jury's recommenda­
tion.321 The Court held that the provision unconstitutionally bur­
dened the rights of an accused to proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
and to a jury trial because a defendant could only avoid a potential 
death sentence by a plea of guilty or a waiver of jury trial.322 To 
save the death penalty portion of the statute the government pro­
posed a number of alternative constructions and cited procedures 
developed by other district courts as remedies for the constitutional 
problems. The Supreme Court rejected each approach in favor of 
legislative and not judicial action.323 
319. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-34 (1812) (stating that 
federal criminal law may only be created by statute). 
320. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) (holding that courts have 
no inherent power to circumvent rules, statutes, or the Constitution). 
321. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,571 (1968) (holding the death penalty 
provision of kidnapping statute unconstitutional because it made the risk of death the 
price for asserting one's constitutional right to a jury trial). 
322. Id. at 581. 
323. For example, the government proposed a construction of the statute under 
which "even if the trial judge accepts a guilty plea or approves a jury waiver, the judge 
remains free ... to convene a special jury for the limited purpose of deciding whether to 
recommend the death penalty." Id. at 572. The government also suggested that the 
Court might save the statute by reading it to make imposition of the death penalty 
discretionary on the part of the sentencing judge. Id. at 575. The Court rejected these 
proposed remedies. 
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In Jackson, the Court pointed out that the kidnapping statute 
set forth no procedure for imposing the death penalty upon a de­
fendant who waived the right to jury trial or upon one who pleaded 
guilty.324 The Court did not desire to create new rules in order to 
save an unconstitutional procedure.325 
In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Supreme Court defined struc­
tural error as a situation when the entire conduct of a trial is af­
fected.326 In that situation a harmless error analysis does not 
apply.327 Structural error occurs when "a reviewing court can only 
engage in pure speculation-its view of what a reasonable jury 
would have done."328 Nothing could be more speculative than try­
ing to figure out whether a jury was influenced to convict a defen­
dant of capital murder based upon punishment evidence. 
Regardless of what jurors are told to do, there is no way to know 
whether they improperly considered punishment evidence while de­
liberating about capital elements, especially after a combined hear­
ing and during a single deliberation. 
The placement of offense elements during a sentencing hearing 
will affect the entire conduct of a trial. In jurisdictions where of­
fense elements are left to the sentencing hearing, if a defendant 
wants to contest the charge of capital murder, but not contest a 
lesser included offense such as simple murder, the defendant must 
either sit mute during the trial or plead guilty to the underlying 
murder and then participate in a sentencing hearing to determine 
whether he is guilty of capital murder. 
This is different than any other kind of criminal trial (where 
proof of guilt and punishment are completely separate) and affects 
324. It is one thing to fill a minor gap in a statute-to extrapolate from its 
general design details that were inadvertently omitted. It is quite another thing 
to create from whole cloth a complex and completely novel procedure and to 
thrust it upon unwilling defendants for the sole purpose of rescuing a statute 
from a charge of unconstitutionality. 
Id. at 580. 
325. [d. at 580 n.17 ("It is not surprising that courts confronted with such 
problems have concluded that their solution requires 'comprehensive legislative and 
not piecemeal judicial action."') (quoting State v. Mount, 152 A.2d 343, 358 (N.J. 
1959». 
326. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,309-10 (1991) (listing examples of con­
stitutional errors). 
327. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262-64 (1986) (holding unlawful an 
exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury); Waller v. Georgia, 467 
U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (the right to public trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 
n.8 (1984) (the right to self-representation at trial). 
328. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (holding that a deficient rea­
sonable doubt instruction required reversal). 
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every decision by a capital defendant, from what questions to ask 
during voir dire to the substance of closing argument. Imagine a 
non-capital case where an element of the crime is not considered 
until after conviction.329 It would be ridiculous but no different 
than leaving capital elements to be decided at a capital sentencing 
hearing. 
It is impossible to know whether Congress would want to apply 
the Federal Rules of Evidence to the statutory aggravating circum­
stances and culpability findings alone, or whether Congress would 
want to apply them to the other findings as well - such as mitigating 
circumstances and non-statutory aggravating factors.33o Applying 
the Federal Rules of Evidence to mitigating proof would seriously 
impinge on a defendant's Eighth Amendment right to introduce 
any and all mitigating evidence.331 
Legislatures could have done what Justice Scalia suggested in 
Ring: "plac[e] the aggravating-factor determination (where it logi­
cally belongs anyway) in the guilt phase."332 However, Congress 
chose not to. We can only assume that Congress meant to meet 
constitutional requirements at the time they enacted the FDPA.333 
Those requirements have now changed because of Ring. We do not 
know which of these policy choices, each one fraught with practical 
complexities on one side and potential constitutional problems on 
the other, Congress would have chosen in light of the Court's new 
approach to treating sentencing hearing findings as elements of a 
capital crime. 
B. Federal Cases 
Since Ring, federal courts have examined two issues regarding 
the validity of the FDPA: (1) whether indictments must allege the 
capital elements,334 and (2) whether the rules of evidence apply at 
329. Cf Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999) (dispensing with jury finding 
of minor element of materiality in white collar tax case was subject to harmless error 
analysis). 
330. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 384 (1999) ("[1]n light of congres­
sional silence, we will not exercise our supervisory powers to require that an instruction 
of the sort petitioner sought be given in every case."). 
331. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606-07 (1978) (limiting defendants' miti­
gating evidence would clearly violate the Eighth Amendment). 
332. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
333. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (discussing that Congress is 
assumed to legislate in light of constitutional limitations). 
334. See, e.g., United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970, 979 (W.D. Tenn. 
2003) (the mens rea and aggravating factors must be charged by indictment). 
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capital sentencing hearings.335 The first issue has been fairly uncon­
troversial. Courts have agreed that federal indictments require no­
tice of the facts necessary to seek capital punishment.336 Federal 
prosecutors generally concede this issue and now supercede indict­
ments to allege capital elements whenever the decision is made to 
seek the death penalty.337 
The latter issue, the application of the rules of evidence, is hav­
ing mixed responses. Only one district judge has found the FDPA 
unconstitutional for failure to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence 
to prove the culpable mental state and statutory aggravating fac­
tOr.338 That decision was later reversed by the Second Circuit.339 
Some judges have ordered the Federal Rules of Evidence be 
applied to the government at the sentencing hearing despite the 
prohibition under the FDPA.340 
Other courts have assumed that evidence, which would violate 
a capital defendant's constitutional rights at trial, such as evidence 
prohibite~ by the Confrontation Clause, is also inadmissible at the 
sentencing hearing.341 However, there may not be authority to sup­
335. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 142 (N.D.N.Y. 
2002) ("The Federal Rules of Evidence are not constitutionally mandated per se."). 
336. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (requiring indictment for offenses "punishable by 
death"); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 8 (1959) (requiring indictment in capital 
cases); United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 297 (4th Cir. 2003). 
337. See Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (discussing capital elements added by 
superceding indictment). 
338. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 490 (D. VI. 2002) (Sessions, J.). 
But see United States v. Battle, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373-74 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (granting 
certificate of appealability based on Fell). 
339. United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 2004). 
340. The Government is further advised that it may only proffer evidence that 
meets the requirement of heightened reliability as reflected by, at a minimum, 
the Federal Rules of Evidence both at trial and sentencing for the reasons 
stated on the record. However, Mr. Bass is not bound by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence or any heightened standard as it relates to the penalty phase of the 
trial. 
United States v. Bass, No. 97-80235 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (Tarnow, J.). See also United 
States v. Denis, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 2002) ("In this case, the gov­
ernment has agreed not to introduce hearsay and the court will apply the strict rules of 
evidence."); United States v. Mikos, No. 02-137-1, 2003 U.S. Dist. WL 22110948, at *11 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2003) (ruling that the Federal Rules of Evidence will be applied if 
the case goes to a sentencing phase). 
341. See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 672, 684 (E.D. Va. 2002) 
(alleging that Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause concerns are protected at fed­
eral capital sentencing); see also United States v. Acosta-Martinez, 265 F. Supp. 2d 181, 
185 (D.P.R. 2003). 
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port such a right,342 Some courts have simply found that rules of 
evidence do not apply at a federal capital sentencing hearing at 
all.343 
Absent guidance from the Supreme Court, district courts are 
likely to try many options; however, all appear to be flawed. Either 
they violate the clear language of the statute by imposing rules of 
evidence, or they violate due process by the disparate treatment of 
capital elements. For example, a court could try applying the rules 
of evidence to the government's proof of the capital elements. 
There are at least two problems with this method. First, it violates 
the plain language of the FDPA, which prohibits the rules of evi­
dence at capital sentencing hearings. Second, it fails to address the 
effect of other punishment evidence, inadmissible under the rules of 
evidence, which would be introduced at the same hearing. 
Another option might be to apply the rules of evidence to all 
prosecution proof at capital sentencing hearings. That solution also 
violates the plain words of the statute, but the effect would be more 
dramatic. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence virtually no tradi­
tional sentencing information would be admissible. There would be 
little character evidence, and no proof of propensity.344 There 
would be no victim impact evidence that was not relevant to an 
element of the crime.345 Hearsay would be prohibited, except for 
recognized exceptions.346 Proof of prior acts by defendants would 
be limited. Therefore, very little traditional punishment evidence 
would be admissible, other than the facts of the crime. 
A court might "trifurcate" a capital trial. In other words, first 
there would be a trial of the underlying murder. Second, if the de­
fendant were convicted, there would be a trial of the additional ele­
ments of capital murder. Third, if the defendant were convicted of 
capital murder, there would be a sentencing hearing. The problem 
with trifurcation is that it requires rewriting the FDPA. The statute 
clearly approves only a very specific bifurcated procedure.347 For a 
342. See United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 324 (4th Cir. 2003) (questioning 
whether Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing). 
343. See United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977-79 (W.D. Tenn. 2003); 
United States v. Johnson, 239 F. Supp. 2d 924, 946 (N.D. Iowa 2003); United States v. 
Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 141-46 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). 
344. See FED. R. EVID. 404 ("Character Evidence Not Admissible To Prove 
Conduct"). 
345. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991) (stating that victim impact 
is relevant to gUilt when it is probative of an element of the crime). 
346. See FED. R. EVID. 802-05, 807 ("Hearsay Rule" and "Hearsay Exceptions"). 
347. 18 U.S.c. §§ 3591-3598 (2000) (trial precedes sentencing hearing). 
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court to simply create a new procedure that changes the entire dy­
namic of a capital trial would seem to violate the separation of pow­
ers between the judicial and legislative branches of government,348 
While judges have wide authority to interpret laws, they are not 
entitled to write them.349 
The only issues the courts have reached are the failure of the 
FDPA to require indictment of capital elements and the prohibition 
against applying the Federal Rules of Evidence. All courts have 
agreed that although capital elements must be indicted, the FDPA 
is not invalid for only requiring written notice.350 As to the latter 
issue, one court has held the FDPA unconstitutional for its aban­
donment of the rules of evidence,351 while all other courts have re­
jected the claim.352 
The courts that have rejected this claim do so on the basis that 
the Federal Rules of Evidence are not constitutionally guaranteed 
and because the Supreme Court has upheld relaxed evidentiary 
procedures at capital sentencing hearings.353 As stated earlier, 
these responses are beside the point. First, there is no precedent for 
treating some elements of capital murder to less exacting proof than 
any other crime. Second, when the Supreme Court upheld a re­
laxed evidentiary proceeding in capital cases, it was in reference to 
selecting punishment and not to determining elements of an of­
fense.354 Third, that would mean that Congress can enact crimes 
that are exempt from any evidentiary rules. 
The one case where the FDPA was held unconstitutional for 
failure to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence was United States v. 
Fell.355 In that case, the district court reasoned that capital ele­
ments must be treated like any other offense element, including ap­
348. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (1997) (Congress, not the 
courts, make the laws). 
349. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (only Congress 
can create elements of a crime). 
350. See Esparza v. Mitchell, 310 F.3d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that FDPA 
does not prohibit indictment of capital elements), rev'd by, Mitchell v. Esparza, 124 
S.Ct. 1124 (2004). 
351. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 490 (D. Vt. 2002) (FDPA held 
unconstitutional), vacated by, 360 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2004). 
352. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 142-46 (N.D.N.Y. 
2002) (explaining that particular rules of evidence are not constitutionally required). 
353. Id. (citing to various Supreme Court opinions). 
354. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990), overruled by, Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
355. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 490 (D.Vt. 2002). 
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plication of the rules of evidence.356 The district court stated, "In 
effect, the government would approve death eligibility as the fed­
eral criminal justice system's sole exception to the practice of re­
quiring that offense elements be proven by admissible evidence 
comporting with due process and fair trial guarantees. This makes 
no sense. "357 
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's order striking 
down the FDPA.358 The court of appeals found that the admissibil­
ity standard of the FDPA, which states "that information may be 
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creat­
ing unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury," 
allowed the court to exclude evidence that violated Fell's constitu­
tional rights. 
In Fell, at issue was a confession taken by law enforcement of­
ficers from Fell's co-defendant, Lee.359 Lee later died. He was 
never cross-examined. The government intended to use the state­
ment at the sentencing hearing to prove aggravating factors alleged 
in the indictment. It was undisputed that the statement was inad­
missible hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence.36o 
The court of appeals found that since the Federal Rules of Evi­
dence were not constitutionally mandated, that the FDPA standard 
was a reliable substitute. The court held that the district court 
might exclude the statement pursuant to the FDPA's test for unfair 
prejudice.361 
One week later, the Supreme Court issued Crawford v. Wash­
ington.362 That case affected the Fell decision in two ways. First, 
the Second Circuit's direction to the district court that it had discre­
tion to exclude the statement based on unfair prejudice was incor­
rect, since Crawford commanded that such a statement must be 
excluded as a matter of constitutionallaw.363 Second, and more im­
portant, the court of appeals' premise, that a judge's decision about 
the reliability of evidence can be a sufficient test for admissibility, 
356. Id. at 488 ("Every crime set forth in the United States Code is defined in 
terms of elements, and every element must not only be proven to a jury beyond a rea­
sonable doubt, but be proven by evidence found to be reliable by application of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence."). 
357. Id. 
358. United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 2004). 
359. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 485. 
360. Id. 
361. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004). 
362. Id. 
363. Id. at 1374. 
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was completely undermined by Crawford.364 
Prior to this decision, leaving the admissibility of evidence 
completely up to a judge's discretion had never been described as 
"heightened reliability." As discussed above, the history of Anglo­
American law has been one of criminal jury trials in which defend­
ants are protected by exclusionary rules of evidence, not merely by 
the discretion of judges. 
C. Retroactivity 
Retroactivity of a precedent is an issue if the ruling has 
changed, not merely clarified, the law of the jurisdiction.365 A sub­
stantive change in the law is generally retroactive.366 If the change 
is procedural, then analysis is necessary to see if its retroactive ap­
plication is barred.367 This analysis involves examining when the 
conviction and sentence became final and finding whether the Con­
stitution compelled the rule at that time.368 If it was constitution­
ally compelled, the rule is retroactive.369 If it was not, then it must 
meet one of two exceptions: (1) that it punishes "a class of defend­
ants because of their status or offense;"370 or (2) that it enhances 
accuracy and alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements essential to the fairness of a particular conviction.371 
In Schriro v. Summerlin, the Supreme Court held that its ruling 
in Ring was a procedural change that did not affect fundamental 
fairness. 372 The Court found that Ring did not affect the range of 
conduct subject to the death penalty under Arizona law, only the 
364. Id. at 1375. 
365. See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29 (2001) (holding that retroactivity 
analysis need not be applied to ruling by a state's highest court which merely clarified 
state law). 
366. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998) (allowing defendant to 
rely, in his defense, on a previous substantive change in law). 
367. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) ("[N]ew constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before 
the new rules are announced."). 
368. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156-57 (1997) (holding that change to 
procedure was a new rule and not retroactive). 
369. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306-07. 
370. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989). 
371. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) ("clearly meant to apply only to 
a small core of rules requiring observance of 'those procedures that ... are implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty"') (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311) (quoting MacKey v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937». 
372. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2526-27 (2004). 
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methods of its determination.373 Since the Court could not say that 
a judicial finding seriously diminishes accuracy, it was not held to be 
fundamentally unfair.374 Ring is therefore not retroactive, and is 
inapplicable to cases that were final at the time. 
There are two reasons why a successful challenge to the FDPA 
may be retroactive. First, although applying rules of evidence is 
only procedural, its effect is far more pervasive than the speculative 
difference between the accuracy of a judge and a jury. It is much 
easier to see why prohibiting character evidence and hearsay would 
fundamentally change the nature of a proceeding. 
Second, it is not merely the lack of evidentiary rules that is at 
issue, but the combination of the trial of guilt and the sentencing 
hearing. If it were held that those proceedings had to be separated, 
that could require a change to the substantive crimes that are eligi­
ble for the death penalty. Such a change would likely be 
retroactive.375 
VII. STATE CAPITAL PROCEDURES 
A review of various state capital procedures indicates many 
have the same problems contained in the FDPA.376 In other words, 
capital elements are decided during the sentencing hearing without 
rules of evidence. 
Before Ring, the Supreme Court found there were two types of 
capital schemes: those that narrowed the class of defendants eligible 
for the death penalty at the guilt phase, and those that did so during 
the sentencing phase.377 For example, the Court found Texas to be 
of the former definition before Ring.378 
A post-Ring analysis produces a different result. In Texas, cap­
373. Id. at 2524. 
374. Id. at 2525. 
375. Id. at 2523 ("A rule is substantive rather [than] procedural if it alters the 
range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.") (citing Bousley v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998». 
376. See supra note 20 and accompanying statutes. 
377. It seems clear to us from this discussion that the narrowing function re­
quired for a regime of capital punishment may be provided in either of these 
two ways: The legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital offenses, 
as Texas and Louisiana have done, so that the jury finding of guilt responds to 
this concern, or the legislature may more broadly define capital offenses and 
provide for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the 
penalty phase. 
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988). 
378. [d. at 245-46. 
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ital jurors must answer three special issues.379 The first concerns 
the probability that the defendant will be a continuing threat by 
future acts of violence. The second is whether the defendant in­
tended or anticipated that human life would be taken. The third 
asks the jury to consider any evidence mitigating against the death 
penalty. The jury must answer affirmatively to the first two, and 
negatively to the third, before a death sentence may be imposed.380 
After Ring, it would seem that the first two issues of the Texas 
scheme are elements of capital murder. They require a jury to find 
facts, which if proven, make a defendant eligible for the death pen­
alty. Only after those facts are found, can they be weighed against 
mitigating facts to decide whether the death penalty is appropriate. 
In California and Washington, aggravating factors are pleaded 
by indictment and tried during the guilt phase.381 This would seem 
to avoid the problems caused by mixing trial and punishment. 
However, even those systems may require additional proof of ele­
ments at sentencing in cases where the trial instructions fail to ad­
dress whether someone convicted solely as an accomplice can be 
eligible for a death sentence.382 
Maryland requires that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating 
factors before a death sentence may be imposed.383 A majority of 
the Maryland Supreme Court held that this requirement was not an 
element of capital murder, as a defendant was eligible for a death 
sentence once a single aggravating factor was established.384 Only 
Nevada has held that the weighing of factors requires jury 
participation.385 
In Florida, the jury's role at a capital sentencing is advisory, 
both as to eligibility and selection.386 However, even after Ring, 
Florida's highest court has found the procedure is valid.387 
Some legislatures are revising their capital statutes in light of 
379. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 2003) (Texas capital sen­
tencing procedure). 
380. Id. 
381. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060 
(1981). 
382. State v. Roberts, 14 P.3d 713, 734 (Wash. 2000) (reversing death sentence for 
defendant who was not proven to be "major participant"). 
383. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g) (2003). 
384. Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1157-58 (Md. 2003) (upholding death 
sentence). 
385. Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 460 (Nev. 2002). 
386. FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141(2) (2002). 
387. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam). 
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Ring, but those are jurisdictions where judges had been responsible 
for finding the capital elements.388 A few state courts have re­
viewed their states' capital schemes after Ring, but none have 
found them invalid for combining trial and punishment 
proced ures. 389 
CONCLUSION 
Many capital punishment schemes in the United States deter­
mine whether a defendant is guilty of capital murder after a hearing 
that is without the protection of a trial. Recent Supreme Court 
cases put the constitutionality of those procedures in doubt. 
By allowing evidence that would be inadmissible to prove guilt, 
by eliminating the presumption of innocence, and by requiring a 
jury to combine findings regarding elements of the crime with the 
selection of punishment, such death penalty schemes violate due 
process of law and the right to jury trial. There is no historical pre­
cedent for such disparity. The only solution is for legislatures to 
rewrite those capital statutes to require that all elements of a capital 
crime be proven during the guilt phase of trial. 
Although that might seem an easy remedy, there are some dif­
ficult political implications. Adding new elements to existing homi­
cide statutes is a substantive change. Persons whose offenses 
occurred before the enactment of such new laws would not be eligi­
ble for the death penalty. Even a system of trifurcation might be so 
fundamental a change as to require relief for those sentenced to 
death under old schemes. 
Legislatures would also have to deal with issues such as 
whether to include stronger protections against convicting the inno­
cent, the high cost of capital punishment, and evidence of declining 
support for death sentences. Such a situation would require a com­
prehensive, but necessary, reexamination of capital punishment. 
388. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 4209 (2002). 
389. See Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind. 2004); Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 
314,326-27 (Del. 2003); Nebraska v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 631-32 (Neb. 2003). 
